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ABSTRACT
Firms depend heavily on trade credit. This paper introduces a trade credit network into a
structural model of the economy. In an empirical analysis of the model, we find that trade
credit is an elusive insurance: as long as a firm is financially unconstrained and times are good,
more trade credit enhances sales stability and insures against shocks to the firm’s suppliers.
However, if a firm becomes financially constrained or times are bad, trade credit fails to insure
against supplier shocks. Moreover, if the firm is low on cash, trade credit propagates shocks
from a supplier to its customer.
I Introduction
The importance of trade credit is indisputable. As reported by Williams (2008) and re-
counted in Barrot (2016), about 90% of global merchandise is purchased on trade credit.
But can trade credit insure firms against shocks occurring elsewhere in the economy or does
it propagate those shocks? Cuñat (2007) argues that trade credit mitigates shocks and
provides insurance, by transferring part of the risk borne by a customer onto its suppliers.
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Jacobson and von Schedvin (2015) and Barrot (2016), however, focus on the aggravating
aspects of trade credit, including contagion and counterparty risk. This paper reconciles
both views and finds that trade credit is an elusive insurance: as long as a firm is financially
unconstrained, more trade credit enhances sales stability and insures against shocks from a
firm’s suppliers. As soon as the firm becomes financially constrained, trade credit’s stabiliz-
ing abilities come to an end and trade credit itself may serve as a mechanism propagating
supplier shocks downstream the production network.
With this paper, we contribute to the understanding of trade credit in three ways. First,
we propose a model of a multi-sector economy in which we introduce trade credit into
the literature on production relationships and highlight the combined role of trade credit
and production relationships in connecting firm-level shocks. We investigate a mechanism
described by Long and Plosser (1983) and Acemoglu et al. (2012), in which a business cycle
arises as a result of an asymmetric production relationship. We then build on Raddatz (2010)
and Balke (2000) to augment this mechanism with a trade credit dimension.
Second, this study empirically demonstrates that in many circumstances trade credit
indeed serves as an insurance against shocks occurring upstream in a firm’s network. When
empirically testing the model of Acemoglu et al. (2012), augmented with a trade credit
network, we find that on average trade credit lowers the impact of a supplier shock by 20-
25% and thus considerably stabilizes a firm’s sales. We attribute this insurance role of trade
credit to the switching cost theory. According to Cuñat (2007), trade credit is typically a
result of switching costs associated with losing a production partner. Many of the goods
sold on trade credit are likely not to be homogenous nor standardized (Giannetti, Burkart,
and Ellingsen, 2011), making them difficult to resell to other firms (Burkart and Ellingsen,
2004). This in turn makes firms less flexible in changing their production partners. It also
strengthens the customer-supplier relationship. In the latter case, if a supplier receives a
negative productivity shock, it prefers to deliver the goods first to a customer with which
it has a more significant trade credit relationship. But not only negative shocks are insured
against. A positive productivity shock is dampened as well due to the contractual agreement
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between both parties.
Lastly, we contribute to a more thorough understanding of the dark side of trade credit.
Our empirical tests reveal that the insurance properties of trade credit prove elusive when
they are most urgently needed: during recessions, for firms with low cash reserves and
for firms that are heavily dependent on external finance. In their seminal work, Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997, 2002) already postulate that, in the presence of trade credit, financially
constrained firms co-move with their production partners. Recent empirical evidence further
corroborates the causes of this dark side of trade credit. Barrot (2016) document that
long payment terms of trade credit are associated with liquidity risk which drives credit
constrained firms more often to distress. Petersen and Rajan (1997), argue that credit
constrained customers rely on the liquidity provided by their supplier, which then, we argue,
exposes them to fluctuations in the supplier’s performance. We provide empirical evidence
that although generally unobservable, the dark side of trade credit resurfaces once a firm
becomes financially constrained.
To corroborate these findings, we provide evidence that the elusive nature of the insurance
provided by trade credit is unlikely to come from common shocks. By distinguishing firms
that operate in the same region or the same industry, we can exploit cross-sectional variation
at the regional or industry level to more cleanly identify the relationship between trade credit
and sales growth.
Our results rely on the features of a Cobb-Douglass economy. The Cobb-Douglass rep-
resentation of technology and utility implies that shocks can propagate downstream, i.e. by
changing costs of customers of the firm affected by the shock. But the same representation
also means that the shocks do not propagate upstream as explained in Shea (2002) and
Acemoglu et al. (2012). It is a consequence of two competing effects that are assumed to
cancel out: (1) demand for inputs rises following a raise in output price, but at the same time
(2) demand for inputs falls following a fall in the production output. Although commonly
accepted in the literature, we evaluate this assumption. To test if our results are affected by
an upstream propagation of shocks, we distinguish firms that are large, strategic and have
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heavily reliant suppliers. If such a strategic customer grows at a high rate, under upstream
propagation its suppliers should have a positive boost in their sales and be more likely to
grow at a higher rate. In that case, the sub-sample of strategic customers should show
a higher correlation between a customer and its suppliers and lower downstream propaga-
tion. However, we find no evidence of this reverse causality, suggesting that the downstream
propagation of shocks from suppliers to customers prevails, as proposed in the economic
model.
The remainder of this paper continues as follows. In Section II, we introduce a trade
credit relationship into the model of Acemoglu et al. (2012). Section III describes our
empirical approach, and in Section IV we detail our data. Section V contains our empirical
analysis, before we conclude in Section VI.
II Theory
In this section, we introduce a structural model with explicit production and trade credit
relationships. We consider a static version of the multi-sector economy of Long and Plosser
(1983), where the economy is populated by a representative household with given tastes and
production possibilities. We assume the household has a Cobb-Douglas utility function over
n distinct commodities produced by n distinct firms:
u(c1, c2, . . . , cn) =
n∏
i=1
(ci)
1/n, (1)
where ci is the consumption of firms i’s commodity. The household is endowed with one
unit of labor, which is supplied inelastically. At the beginning of each period, the household
decides about its consumption as well as commodity and labor inputs to various produc-
tion transformations to be completed in this period. Those choices are constrained by the
availability of labor and inputs. As we assume the commodities to be perishable, only the
amount produced in a given period can be used as an input in the production process in
that particular period.
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During the period, the production transformation is subject to various exogenous shocks
that alter the production possibilities and ultimately determine the amount of commodities
available for consumption or as production input. These shocks affect the household either
through the production relationship or through the trade credit relationship. Following
Raddatz (2010), we allow a firm i to buy a fraction βi of its input on trade credit. This is
where we extend the model specification of Acemoglu et al. (2012). In particular, a fraction
(1−βi) is paid up-front or on delivery while payment of the fraction βi is due at a later date
and shows up in the customer’s balance sheet as an account payable.
The trade credit dimension is novel to the model and it can affect the production possi-
bilities of the firm. However, whether or not a firm purchases inputs on trade credit, does
not otherwise affect the way in which it transforms inputs into output. Specifically, n firms
buy intermediary inputs from one another and firm i produces a quantity xi of commodity
i according to a Cobb-Douglas technology with constant returns to scale:
xi = z
α
i l
α
i
n∏
j=1
x
(1−α)(1−βi)wij
ij x
(1−α)(1+η)βiwij
ij
= zαi l
α
i
n∏
j=1
x
(1−α)(1+ηβi)wij
ij , (2)
where zi = exp(ξi) is firm i’s specific productivity shock distributed independently across
firms, li is the amount of labor hired by firm i, xij is the amount of commodity j used in
the production process of commodity i and parameter α is the output elasticity of labor in
the economy. Next, the parameter wij ≥ 0 denotes an element in the (n × n) input-output
matrixW that measures the amount spent on input j per dollar of production of firm i. The
column sums of W reflect the importance of a firm as a supplier to other firms’ production
processes. At the firm level, the diagonal ofW is equal to zeroes since a firm does not deliver
to itself.
The impact of trade credit on a firm’s production possibilities is governed by parameter
η. If η assumes a value greater than zero, the inputs purchased on trade credit have greater
output elasticity than the inputs purchased directly. In the reverse situation, if η assumes a
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value less than zero, the inputs purchased directly have greater productivity. As explained in
Appendix A, maintaining the assumption of constant returns to scale, in line with Acemoglu
et al. (2012), ensures that the rate at which labor can be substituted for an intermediate
good xij is not affected by trade credit.
The fact that a firm uses intermediate inputs from other firms is a basis for interconnect-
edness in this economy. The Cobb-Douglass representation of technology and utility implies
that the transmission of firm-level shocks occurs only downstream through the input-output
matrix from supplier to customers. In general, for a non-Cobb-Douglas production technol-
ogy upstream propagation is possible and depends on two competing effects. For example,
a negative shock to a firm has two effects on its demand for inputs. The first effect is an
increase in the price of the firm’s output, which in turn increases the firm’s demand for
intermediate inputs. At the same time, the second effect decreases the quantity produced,
which in turn decreases the firm’s demand for intermediate inputs. As shown before by
Acemoglu et al. (2012) and Shea (2002), for a Cobb-Douglas production technology like the
one employed here, these two effects cancel out, thus excluding the possibility of upstream
shock transmission.
Let y denote the logarithm of real value added, also referred to as aggregate output. In
Appendix B we show that the evolution of aggregate output follows:
y = µ+ u′ξ, (3)
where µ is a constant that depends on model parameters only, ξ is a (n× 1) vector of firm-
level input shocks and u is a (n×1) vector that governs the transmission of firm-level shocks
in the economy. Equation (3) shows how fluctuations in aggregate output originate from
disturbances to a firm’s production possibilities. Those disturbances are weighted by the
importance of the production relationship and the trade credit relationship, reflected by the
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vector u. It holds that:
u =
α
n
[I − (1− α) (1 + ηB)W ′]−1 1, (4)
where B = diag(β1, . . . , βn) and 1 is a (n× 1) vector of ones. Similarly to Raddatz (2010),
the vector u reflects the impact of both the production relationship, through the input-
output matrix W , and the trade credit relationship, through B, in transmitting the firm-
level shocks. In particular, the parameter η is a measure for the importance of the trade
credit relationship. If η assumes a value greater than zero it amplifies the transmission
mechanism that occurs due to the direct production links. Values lower than zero decrease
this transmission mechanism. If trade credit has no effect on the transmission of firm-level
shocks, the parameter η assumes a value of zero and the above equation simplifies to the
influence vector of Acemoglu et al. (2012) given by:
v =
α
n
[I − (1− α)W ′]−1 1. (5)
In the latter case, fluctuations in aggregate output due to firm-level shocks are only trans-
mitted through the production relationship.
We further disentangle the transmission effects by taking a first order Taylor approxima-
tion of u around η = 0 (see Appendix C). It follows that:
u ≈α
n
[I − (1− α)W ′]−1 1 + ηα
n
(1− α) [I − (1− α)W ′]−1BW ′ [I − (1− α)W ′]−1 1
=v + η(1− α) [I − (1− α)W ′]−1BW ′v. (6)
The first term in equation (6) represents the production relationship, and the second term
shows the effect of the trade credit relationship. In particular, in case of negative values for
η, the larger the share of inputs provided on trade credit (B), the smaller the transmission
of input shocks. In this case, trade credit acts as insurance against supplier-level input
shocks. Positive values of η give greater weight to supplier shocks, and therefore magnify
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supplier-level input shocks felt by customer firms.
For a single firm i, equations (3) and (6) imply the following relationship to input shocks
(see Appendix D for full derivation):
yi = µi +
α
n
n∑
j=1
Dijξj + ηβi
α(1− α)
n
n∑
j=1
[DW ′D]ij ξj (7)
where D = [In − (1− α)W ′]−1 and In is the (n × n) identity matrix. Equation (7) is the
basis for the empirical specifications that we propose in the next section.
III Empirical approach
In this section, we explain our estimation procedure, after introducing our key variables,
starting with firm activity. Various empirical proxies for firm activity have been proposed
in the literature. These proxies include the value added per worker (Gabaix, 2011), total
factor productivity (Carvalho and Gabaix, 2013)) and employment (Moscarini and Postel-
Vinay, 2012). Since trade credit is measured as a proportion of sales supplied with a deferred
payment, we follow di Giovanni, Levchenko, and Mejean (2014) and represent firm activity
as follows:
yi ≡ ln(salesi). (8)
Our interest is in particular with the transmission mechanism of shocks originating at a
supplier’s production processes. To that end we quantify firm-level shocks ξi in a manner
similar to Gabaix (2011), that is we set the firm-level shock to be a deviation from a particular
benchmark. Similar to Gabaix (2011), we set this benchmark to be equal to the average of
ln(salesi) over all firms in the economy, denoted with y¯E. The firm-level input shock follows
as the difference between a firm’s sales and the average sales in the economy:
ξˆi = yi − y¯E. (9)
Manski (1993) notices a reflection problem: firms’ activity might be volatile due to com-
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mon shocks, but not necessarily vice versa. To address this reflection problem, we use various
measures for the firm-level input shocks. Alternative specifications include deviations rela-
tive to developments in an industry or in a region. The industry benchmark (y¯I) is given
by the average of ln(salesi) over firms in a particular industry, based on the four digit SIC
industry classification. The region benchmark is given by the average of ln(salesi) over firms
in a region where the region is defined by the state (y¯S) or county (y¯C) of a firm’s headquar-
ter. Those specifications work under the assumption that firms respond to common shocks
with the same sensitivity.
We follow the literature (Gabaix (2011), and di Giovanni, Levchenko, and Mejean (2014))
and look into the growth rate of a firm’s activity and in particular into the growth rate of
sales. Define the growth rate of sales for firm i as gi = ∆yi, which is the difference in log sales
from one year to the other. Also, define the difference in shock to firm i as ei = ∆ξi, which is
the change in log sales from one year to the other relative to the change in their benchmark.
The resulting empirical relationship follows by taking first differences in equation (7):
gi = φ
{
n∑
j=1
(α
n
Dij
)
ej
}
+ η
{
n∑
j=1
βi
α(1− α)
n
[DW ′D]ij ej
}
+ εi i = 1, . . . , n (10)
The first term in equation (10), which we refer to as the production relationship exposure,
depicts the relationship between a customer’s sales growth and production in the absence
of trade credit, or if trade credit does not matter for transmission of firm-level shocks. It
is a weighted sum of firm-level suppliers’ shocks, where the weights depend on the relative
importance of the suppliers for a customer’s production process. A parameter φ has been
included in this first term. From the theoretical model in equation (7) we expect the estimate
of parameter φ to be equal to one.
The second term in equation (10), which we refer to as trade credit exposure, is a weighted
sum of firm-level supplier input shocks with weights determined by a supplier’s importance
in delivering inputs and its position as a trade credit provider. In the second term, the
parameter η indicates the importance of the trade credit relationship in the transmission of
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firm-level shocks. Positive values of η amplify the shocks to the production process, while
negative values insure against them. If η = 0, the trade credit relationship is irrelevant for
the transmission of shocks between firms.
Equation (10) includes parameters α, βi, W and D. In the next section we will propose
proxies for these parameters. The remaining parameters φ and η are the focus of this study,
and will be estimated by minimizing the sum of squared residuals (
∑n
i=1
ε2i ). In particular,
we investigate the role of trade credit in transmitting firm-level shocks. In normal times,
we expect the estimate of η to be negative and significantly associated with customers’ sales
growth. However, during recessions or in case of financially constrained firms, we expect η
to be zero or positive as trade credit may amplify shocks to customers, similar to Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997).
In the empirical analysis, we also verify that the correlation between shocks to suppliers
and the sales growth of their customer is not driven by either a common shock or by a reverse
causal relationship from customer to supplier.
In order to test that, we first evaluate if shocks to suppliers are spuriously correlated
with a customer’s sales growth as a result of exposure to common shocks. We address
this problem by the way in which shocks to suppliers are computed: we disentangle the
common component from the firm-level component by demeaning suppliers’ growth rate on
the economy, industry, state and county level. As a result, suppliers’ shocks are equivalent
to suppliers’ excess growth relative to an economy, industry, state and county benchmark.
The excess growth is meant to be firm-specific and represents the idiosyncratic component
of their sales growth.
Moreover, we estimate a specification with time-varying industry and state fixed effects
to capture common shocks which might have affected firms in one industry or state dispro-
portionally to the rest of the economy. To illustrate this consider a supplier linked to two
customers A and B by the same kind of production process relationship and a different trade
credit relationship. Customer A operates in the same four digit SIC industry as the supplier
and receives low trade credit. In contrast, customer B operates in another industry and
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receives high trade credit. Now, if a positive common shock affects the industry in which the
supplier and customer A operate, the supplier experiences a positive excess growth shock
relative to the economy benchmark and customer A grows at a higher rate. On the other
hand, customer B does not reap the benefits of this positive common shock and grows at a
lower rate. The lower growth rate of customer B may seem to be related to the higher trade
credit ratio while in fact it is due to missing out on the positive common shock. If for some
reason customers tend to have a lower trade credit relationship with their suppliers in the
same industry or in the same region, the effect of common shocks can be controlled for by
time varying industry effects or time varying region fixed effects.1
To address the second issue, we notice that a reverse causal relationship would imply a
transmission mechanism that works from customer to supplier, where a high growth rate
of a customer would trigger a positive shock to its supplier, but less so with an increase
in trade credit. Cases where a development in customer growth is followed by a response
in its suppliers’ excess growth should intuitively involve customers that are important and
strategic to their suppliers. Purchases from those strategic customers correspond to a high
share of suppliers’ sales and swings in customers’ demand are more likely to be reflected in
changes in the growth of their suppliers. By focusing on a sub-sample of customers that are
strategic to their suppliers, we allow for the reverse causal relationship to be revealed. In
this particular sub-sample, a reverse causal relationship would manifest itself by an increased
correlation. In the results section we will explicitly investigate this case.
IV Data
At the heart of our data is a list of customer-supplier pairs. Under the Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards (SFAS), rule no. 131, a firm needs to disclose certain information on
its operating segments. In particular, a firm is required to reveal the identity of its major
customers that purchase above 10% of its sales. We use a sample of such customer-supplier
1This can be the case, for example, if firms use trade credit to deal with information asymmetry of
their production partners by screening firms in a different industry rather than those operating in the same
industry (Smith, 1987).
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pairs identified by Cohen and Frazzini (2008) based on Compustat Segments information.
We can identify each firm in this sample based on its CRSP permno. This allows us to match
the customer-supplier pairs identified by Cohen and Frazzini (2008) with CRSP-Compustat’s
balance sheet information.
In particular, we focus our analysis on customer-supplier pairs in which customers oper-
ate in manufacturing, transportation, wholesale and retail trade (SIC code 2000-5999). The
customer-supplier pairs are required to have a match to Compustat balance sheet informa-
tion, non-missing values of assets, non-missing values of cost of goods sold, and non-missing
values of sales in two consecutive years. The final set contains 4,785 unique customer-year
observations. Each of these observations is connected on average to 2.71 suppliers with a
total of 12,985 unique customer-supplier-year observations over the years 1980 to 2004.
The customers reported in Panel A of Table I tend to be larger than the suppliers in Panel
D. This discrepancy is partially due to the way the customer-supplier pairs are identified.
The customers reported in Compustat Segments, and therefore in the Cohen and Frazzini
(2008) sample, are those that correspond to at least 10% of sales. Those firms are inclined
to be larger with assets on average almost 13 times higher and sales 14 times higher than
the sample of suppliers. During the entire sample period, on average both customers and
suppliers experience a positive sales growth rate (g) illustrated in Figure 1. For most of the
time it stays positive with a short episode of negative growth in 2002.
In our analysis, we approximate three elements of equation (10): the weights attributed
to suppliers that define the production relationship, the weights attributed to suppliers that
define the trade credit relationship and finally the supplier shocks.
To compute the weights defining the production relationship, we approximate parameter
wij and parameter α. Parameter wij is said to capture the amount spent on input j per
dollar of production of firm i. On a firm level, we approximate it by the ratio of sales from
supplier (firm j) to customer (firm i) over a customer’s cost of goods sold (Compustat item
cogs). It represents the amount customer i spent on inputs from supplier j per dollar amount
of its production cost. On average, about 4.2% of a customer’s input comes from one of its
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suppliers. The labor income share denoted by α is assumed to be constant over the whole
economy and takes a value of 0.61. We compute it from the OECD data on Unit Labor
Costs as the average of the Labor Income Share (Real ULC) between 1995 and 2004, the
period for which it is available.
To compute the weights defining the trade credit relationship, we compute the share of
trade credit received by a customer (βi). To this end we follow Raddatz (2010) and measure
βi as the ratio of a customer’s accounts payable (Compustat item ap) over its cost of goods
sold (Compustat item cogs). It depicts the proportion of purchased inputs with deferred
payment and typically reflects the share of goods that the customer purchased on trade
credit. Since we do not observe the share of trade credit contributed by individual suppliers,
we assume this share to be equal across all suppliers delivering to a given customer. In
our sample, customers buy about 15% of their inputs on trade credit. Their dependence
on trade credit is comparable with the U.S. firms in Raddatz (2010), which finance about
13% of inputs with trade credit.2 Figure 2 illustrates the time series development of the
proportion of inputs delivered on trade credit. Over the sample period of 25 years there is
an increase in the amount of trade credit used with a slight drop during recessions.
Lastly, we quantify supplier shocks ej as a deviation from a benchmark. The benchmark
is given by an average ln(sales) growth among a group of firms to which the supplier belongs.
We compute the economy ln(sales) growth (g¯E) as the average growth among all the firms
in the Compustat universe. Next, we categorize firms into industries based on the four digit
SIC code to compute the industry benchmark as an average of sales growth over firms in the
same industry. We repeat this exercise and compute the state benchmark as an average of
ln(sales) growth over firms in the same U.S. state and the county benchmark as an average
of sales growth over all firms operating in the same county.
Figure 3 illustrates the time series evolution of the supplier shocks estimated relative
to economy, industry, state and county benchmark. There is a considerable commonality
between the supplier shocks and the average sales growth rate among suppliers. In general,
2Raddatz’s (2010) sample includes a universe of U.S. firms in Compustat over a similar time period.
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their behavior is closely related and both values co-move together. For example, during the
NBER recessions, illustrated by the shaded areas, both the benchmark and the average sales
of suppliers tend to drop considerably.
In Table II we examine the correlations between customer and supplier sales growth,
and the benchmarks. The correlations are computed from yearly observations pooled across
all the customer and supplier firms. At the bottom of column (2) we report the correla-
tions between supplier sales growth and the shocks to customer sales growth using different
benchmarks. The high correlation indicates that there is a considerable commonality be-
tween disturbances to customer sales growth and supplier sales growth.
V Empirical results
Our empirical analysis consists of four steps. First, we establish whether shocks to suppliers
are indeed transmitted through the customer-supplier network and find out how different
elements of that customer-supplier network - production relationship and trade credit - con-
tribute to the direction and magnitude of that transmission mechanism. Next, we investigate
how common shocks affect the transmission mechanism of both elements. Third, we verify
the robustness of the distinction between these two elements. Finally, we delve deeper into
the role of trade credit as an elusive insurance mechanism.
A Shock transmission through a production relationship
From our theoretical model in Section II, we learn that, in general, the use of credit in the
customer-supplier relationship may work as insurance against shocks to suppliers and may
reduce disturbances to customers’ sales. Whether those shocks to suppliers are transmitted
through the customer-supplier network and what is the role of production relationship and
trade credit relationship, is answered in Table III.
Based on the economic model, we hypothesize the relationship between sales growth and
production relationship (φ) to be equal to one, as the change to customers’ sales should
be greater with a greater shock to its crucial suppliers of inputs. Likewise, we hypothesize
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the relationship between customers’ sales growth and the trade credit relationship (η) to be
negative since trade credit is expected to act as insurance against supplier shocks.
Column (1) of Table III allows for a basic test of both hypotheses. Indeed, we find that
production relationship propagates shocks from a supplier onto its customer with a value
for φ that is not statistically different from one. Also, the use of trade credit reduces the
severity of shocks and acts as an insurance. When we control for fixed effects in Column (2),
both results appear to be robust.
Both effects are also economically sizable. Depending on the specification, in the absence
of trade credit a one standard deviation positive (negative) shock to all suppliers increases
(decreases) customer’s sales growth by about 0.50%. If trade credit accompanies that same
production relationship the disturbance is lower and amounts to about 0.40%. In other
words, a customer experiences about 20-25% lower disruption to its sales from a shock to its
supplier if trade credit exists next to a production relationship.3
B The transmission and common shocks
In our analysis so far, we have implicitly assumed that a shock affects a single supplier, and
has no direct impact on others other than through production and trade credit relationships.
In the following, we deal with the possibility of same shock striking multiple firms. In
particular, we address the possibility of a common shock to suppliers and customers in the
same industry or state.
Imagine a positive common shock to a given industry (or state) at a given point in time.
Contrast one customer-supplier pair that operates in the affected industry with a second
customer-supplier pair in which the customer operates in another industry. In the former
case, the high correlation between the state of the customer and the state of its supplier
could result from their exposure to the common shock rather than from a trade credit
relationship. In the latter case, however, the customer is not directly exposed to the shock
3Note that our matrix of network is not exhaustive and we are missing the customer-supplier network that
do not pass the 10% threshold to be reported in the Compustat Segments database. However, we believe
that in the limit those connections could be approximated by the industry or state or county benchmark. In
turn this leaves those connections with no impact on the analysis as their shocks are equal to zero.
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and any correlation between its state and that of its supplier is more likely to come from
trade credit usage in the absence of exposure to the common shock.
We therefore isolate the effect of common shocks from the effects of the production
relationship and the trade credit relationship by means of time varying industry and state
fixed effects. Results are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table III and appear robust to
common shocks. Customers are affected more by shocks to crucial suppliers of inputs but
less so if trade credit accompanies the production relationship. These results are in line with
Gao (2014), who shows that in a tight network of customer-supplier relationships, a liquidity
shock to one firm triggers a flow of liquidity from other parts of the network. One example is
Bosch that supported its liquidity-constrained suppliers by offering them forward payments
and reimbursement of raw materials. In this example behavior of Bosch comes from a tight
customer-supplier relationship and aims at buffering the effects of shocks to its suppliers.
Alternatively in Table VII, Table VIII and Table IX we specify firm-level shocks as devi-
ation from an industry, state or county benchmark. Those specifications should disentangle
any common shock on industry, state or county level from a supplier-level shock. In Panel
A of each of these tables we repeat our analysis and find robust evidence of trade credit
insurance abilities.
C Distinguishing between trade credit and production relationship
Until now, we have established that a customer-supplier network, related to production and
to trade credit, affects the transmission of shocks. Now, we put more effort into distinguish-
ing between the strength of the production relationship and the trade credit relationship,
respectively.
We start in Column (1) of Table IV by repeating our analysis for a sub-sample of firms
with very low shares of trade credit. For these firms, the production process forms the base
for their interconnections. Hence, we expect to find that the trade credit relationship has
a negligible effect on sales growth for this sub-sample. Indeed, our results show that for
this sub-sample the production relationship is the only channel through which shocks are
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transmitted.
In Column (2) of Table IV, we take the above examination one step further and drop
the trade credit relationship from our analysis. As a result, we effectively estimate the
Acemoglu et al. (2012) model, which assumes that only the production relationship can
propagate shocks from suppliers onto customers. If trade credit has an insurance effect, we
expect to understate the size of the production relationship in this estimation. Indeed, that
is what we find.
Next, in Column (3) we provide a more direct comparison of our results with the predic-
tions from the Acemoglu et al. (2012) model, by constraining the coefficient of the produc-
tion relationship at its theoretical value, equal to one. From the Table, we observe that the
economic magnitude of the trade credit relationship remains unchanged.
Finally, in Column (4) we focus on a sub-sample of strategic customers, who are of
particular importance for their suppliers. Doing so, allows us to address possible reverse
causality issues. After all, a change in a firm’s state can originate on the supplier side
(downstream propagation) or on the customer side (upstream propagation). In the economic
model we allow for downstream propagation, not upstream propagation. In the latter case,
if a strategic customer grows at a high rate, as a consequence its supplier is expected to
have a positive boost in its sales and is likely to grow at a rate higher than the rest of the
economy. Thus, focusing on a sub-sample of strategic customers should increase the scope
of upstream propagation while diminishing the downstream propagation. This provides us
with a perfect testing ground of possible reverse causality. For each customer, we find its
minimum share in suppliers’ sales. Next, we rank all customers according to that minimum.
Results in Column (4) show that the top decile most strategic customers do not exhibit a
higher correlation with their suppliers’ excess growth, confirming that our analysis primarily
captures the downstream propagation of shocks from suppliers onto their customers.
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D Trade credit as an elusive insurance
In the final part of our analysis, we focus in more detail on the role of trade credit. Thus
far, we have found that both the production relationship and the trade credit relationship
play an important role in the downstream transmission of shocks. On the face of it, trade
credit appears to act as an insurance against disruptions caused by supplier shocks: after a
negative shock to its supplier, a customer grows at a higher rate than it would have grown
had it not received any trade credit.
Here, we study how reliable the implicit insurance offered by trade credit is in practice by
zooming in on those customers that are indeed financially constrained. Of course it is possible
that suppliers end trade credit once a customer becomes financially constrained. However,
Panels B and C of Table I provide evidence to the contrary: we do not observe a significant
drop in trade credit provision during recessions. Therefore, we re-estimate equation (10) and
include a measure of how financially constrained a customer is, which we then also interact
with the trade credit relationship. If trade credit is a durable and reliable insurance against
shocks from production partners, the interaction term should be negative and significant or
at least insignificant.
Table V contains estimation results for three different measures of how financially con-
strained the customer is. The simplest measure is included in Column (1), in which we
concentrate on recessions, when a large number of firms is expected to be financially con-
strained. As it turns out, during recessions trade credit does not insure customers against
shocks propagated from their suppliers. Firms with high trade credit are systematically less
able to reap the benefits of positive developments in good times and in bad times are in
general less resilient to shocks propagating from their suppliers.
We continue this line of thought in Column (2), where we define firms to be financially
constrained if in a given year their cash reserves relative to their sales are in the bottom
5 percentile. For such cash-poor firms, we observe a contagion effect similar to Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) where trade credit not only is a very poor insurance against shocks from
suppliers but it also amplifies those shocks and further destabilizes customers’ sales.
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In Column (3), we consider firms to be financially constrained following Rajan and Zin-
gales (1998), who measure firms’ dependence on external finance.4 Again, trade credit fails
to provide insurance for the most vulnerable firms. For the top decile of most financially
constrained firms, it does not matter if the firm is using trade credit or not: the shock to its
supplier will hit it with the same strength.
As a final step, we challenge these results by once again controlling for common shocks
and reverse causality. Table VI reports the results for recession times and the Rajan and
Zingales (1998) measure of firm’s dependence on external finance. In Columns (1) and (2), we
include time varying fixed effects and control for the effect of common shocks. Our findings
and the economic magnitude of the effects remains unchanged. Columns (3) and (4) tackle
the issue of reverse causality by including an indicator which is equal to one if a customer
has many heavily reliant suppliers, and zero otherwise. With no increase in correlation
for those customers we find no evidence of reverse causality. Results are also robust to
using an industry benchmark where shocks are computed as a deviation from the industry
average (Table VII), to using a state benchmark in which suppliers shocks are computed as
a deviation from the state average (Table VIII) and to using a county benchmark in which
suppliers shocks are computed as a deviation from the county average (Table IX).
VI Concluding remarks
This paper finds that the transmission of shocks downstream the customer-supplier relation-
ship process depends both on the strength of the production relationship between suppliers
and customers and on the extent to which the former provide trade credit to the latter. Not
accounting for the trade credit relationship results in an overestimation of the importance
of the production relationship, since the trade credit relationship on average mitigates the
impact of shocks.
Once we delve deeper into these findings, however, we find that trade credit is an elusive
4They use the ratio of capital expenditures (Compustat item capx ) reduced by the sum of funds from
operations (fopt), inventory (invch), accounts receivable (recch) and accounts payable (apalch) to capital
expenditures.
19
insurance against shocks from production partners. The insurance aspect of trade credit
only works if customers do not need it, i.e., if they are not financially constrained. In
unfavorable situations, trade credit further lowers sales stability and provides no insurance
against shocks propagating downstream from suppliers. Our results are robust to common
shocks and appear not to be affected by possible upstream propagation of shocks. Also, the
results hold for a broad range of measures of how financially constrained a firm is.
The main takeaway from our analysis is that firms may overestimate the importance
of trade credit. The latter can be seen as an important element of building a relationship
between customers and suppliers, and reflects the trust that both parties have in that re-
lationship. However, the economic value of trade credit is in fact lowest when customers
may need it the most: when they are financially constrained and/or find themselves in a
recession.
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Appendix A Production function
In order to assess relationship between the production function we use and the role of trade
credit, we must start with the assumption of constant returns to scale. Imposing constant
returns to scale on the production function in equation (2), implies that:
∑
j wij =
1
1+ηβi
.
We note, however, that the constant returns to scale assumption does not necessarily imply
that the marginal rate of technical substitution (MRTS) between labor and an intermediate
input xij is constant. We start by simplifying notation on our production function:
xi = z
α
i l
α
i
n∏
j=1
x
β∗i
ij , (A1)
noting that now β∗i = (1− α)(1 + ηβi)wij and α + β∗i = 1 implies CRS. We can then derive
the marginal productivity of labor, MPl:
MPl = αz
α
i l
α−1
i
n∏
j=1
x
β∗i
ij . (A2)
Likewise, the marginal productivity of an intermediate input, MPxij is:
MPxij = β
∗
i z
α
i l
α
i
n∏
j=1
x
β∗i −1
ij (A3)
Hence:
MRTS =
MPl
MPxij
=
αzαi l
α−1
i
∏n
j=1 x
β∗i
ij
β∗i z
α
i l
α
i
∏n
j=1 x
β∗i −1
ij
=
αli
(1 + ηβi)(1− α)wijxij . (A4)
The CRS constraint that
∑
j wij =
1
1+ηβi
, then implies that:
MRTS =
αli
(1− α)xij . (A5)
Hence, our CRS constraint implies that the rate at which labor can be substituted for an
intermediate good xij is not affected by the trade credit.
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Appendix B Competitive equilibrium
We derive the competitive equilibrium by closely following Acemoglu et al. (2012). The
competitive equilibrium is a set of commodity prices pi, wage h and consumption choices
ci that satisfy the representative household’s utility maximization problem; firms’ profit
maximization problem subject to condition that the commodity and labor markets clear,
that is:
ci +
n∑
j=1
xij = xi (B1)
n∑
i=1
li = 1 (B2)
From the firm i profit maximization problem subject to labor and input choices, li and
xij respectively, we obtain:
li =
αxipi
h
(B3)
xij =
xipi(1− α)(1 + ηβi)
pj
(B4)
In the next step we substitute the optimal labor and input choices into the production
function. By taking logs and simplifying we arrive at the following expression:
αln(h) = αξi + C + ln(pi) + (1− α)(1 + ηβi)
n∑
j=1
wijln(wij) (B5)
− (1− α)(1 + ηβi)
n∑
j=1
wijln(pj)
where C is a constant independent of prices, wage and consumption defined as:
C = αln(α) + (1− α)ln(1− α) + (1− α)ln(1 + ηβi) (B6)
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Next we multiply by the ith element of the u vector and we sum over all i.
n∑
i=1
uiln(h) =
n∑
i=1
uiξi +
C
α
n∑
i=1
ui +
1
α
n∑
i=1
ln(pi)ui (B7)
+
(1− α)
α
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(1 + ηβi)uiwijln(wij)
− (1− α)
α
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(1 + ηβi)wijln(pj)ui
Denote the vector of logarithm prices by ln(p) and the diagonal matrix of trade credit
shares as B = diag(β1, . . . , βn). Then the expression:
1
α
n∑
i=1
ln(pi)ui − (1− α)
α
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(1 + ηβi)wijln(pj)ui (B8)
from the above equation in vector notation is equal to:
1
α
ln(p)u− (1− α)
α
(1 + ηB)ln(p)W ′u =
1
α
ln(p) [I − (1− α)(1 + ηB)W ′]u (B9)
With u = α
n
[I − (1− α) (1 + ηB)W ′]−1 1 the expression in (B9) simplifies to:
1
α
ln(p)u− (1− α)
α
(1 + ηB)ln(p)W ′u =
1
n
ln(p)1 (B10)
From constant returns to scale we have that
∑n
i=1 ui = 1. We use this property to obtain
that:
y = µ+ u′ξ (B11)
where u =
α
n
[I − (1− α) (1 + ηB)W ′]−1 1 (B12)
and µ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
pi +
C
α
+
1− α
α
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(1 + ηβi)uiwijln(wij)
The aggregate fluctuations are equal to a sum of all firm-level shocks weighted by the im-
portance of firms in their production and trade credit relationships.
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Appendix C Taylor expansion
We approximate vector u by taking the first order Taylor approximation of u around η = 0:
u ≈ u(0) + u
′(0)
1!
(η − 0) = α
n
[I − (1− α)W ′]−1 1 + ηu′(o) (C1)
To differentiate vector u we use the property that a derivative of a matrix inverse is equal
to:
dM−1
dη
= −M−1dM
dη
M−1 (C2)
With the matrix M = [I − (1− α) (1 + ηB)W ′] we get:
dM−1
dη
= − [I − (1− α) (1 + ηB)W ′]−1
× d [I − (1− α) (1 + ηB)W
′]
dη
[I − (1− α) (1 + ηB)W ′]−1 (C3)
where the derivative of matrix M with respect to η is given by: dM
dη
= −(1 − α)BW ′. This
yields that:
u ≈α
n
[I − (1− α)W ′]−1 1 + ηα
n
[I − (1− α)W ′]−1 (1− α)BW ′ [I − (1− α)W ′]−1 1
=v + η [I − (1− α)W ′]−1 (1− α)BW ′v. (C4)
Appendix D Firm level relationship
We begin from the aggregate output relationship as in equation (3) in the index notation:
y = µ+
n∑
j=1
ujξj, (D1)
where uj is the jth element of vector u defined as in equation (6):
u ≈ v + η [I − (1− α)W ′]−1 (1− α)BW ′v, (D2)
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and the influence vector of Acemoglu et al. (2012) is defined as in equation (5):
v =
α
n
[I − (1− α)W ′]−1 1. (D3)
Let us define matrix D ≡ [In − (1− α)W ′]−1 such that the influence vector of Acemoglu et
al. (2012) writes as v = α
n
D1, then from (D1), (D2) and (D3) we have:
y = µ+
α
n
n∑
j=1
[D1]j ξj + η
α(1− α)
n
n∑
j=1
[DBW ′D1]j ξj, (D4)
or summing also in the i dimension:
y = µ+
α
n
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Dijξj + η
α(1− α)
n
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
[DBW ′D]ij ξj. (D5)
For y =
∑n
i=1 yi the expression in (D5) becomes:
n∑
i=1
yi = µ+
α
n
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Dijξj + η
α(1− α)
n
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
[DBW ′D]ij ξj. (D6)
which at the firm level is equivalent to:
yi = µi +
α
n
n∑
j=1
Dijξj + η
α(1− α)
n
n∑
j=1
[DBW ′D]ij ξj. (D7)
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Figure 1: Customers sales growth rate. The figure shows the time series development of the average
growth rate of sales among the customers.
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Figure 2: Share of trade credit received βi. The figure shows the time series development of the
average share of trade credit received βi among the customers.
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(b) Industry benchmark
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(c) State benchmark
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(d) County benchmark
Figure 3: Suppliers sales growth rate and the benchmark. The figure shows time series development
of average growth rate of sales among suppliers. It is benchmarked against the average growth rate in the
economy (Panel a), in the industry (Panel b), in the state (Panel c), in the county (Panel d).
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Table I
Descriptive statistics
The sample covers firms referred by Cohen and Frazzini (2008) as customers or suppliers with a match to
Compustat balance sheet information and non-missing values of assets, cost of goods sold and non-missing
values of sales in two consecutive years. Panels A, B and C summarize the sample of customers. Panels D, E
and F summarize the sample of suppliers. Recession years are taken from the NBER business cycle reference
dates and cover years: 1980, 1981, 1982, 1990, 1991 and 2001. The expansion years cover years: from 1983
to 1989, from 1992 to 2000 and from 2002 to 2004. The production relationship exposures are computed as{∑n
j=1
(
α
nDij
)
ej
}
which is the first term in equation (10) and the trade credit exposures are computed as{∑n
j=1 βi
α(1−α)
n [DW
′D]ij ej
}
which is the second term in equation (10).
N Mean SD Min Max
Panel A: Customers descriptive statistics – Years 1980–2004
Assets [$ billions] 4,785 12,693.430 29,418.350 1.987 479,921.000
EBIT [$ billions] 4,693 1,062.749 2,287.461 -10,537.000 35,872.000
Sales [$ billions] 4,785 11,664.360 23,008.660 0.436 286,103.000
Accounts payable 4,785 1,127.797 2,540.814 0.000 28,902.600
Cost of goods sold 4,785 8,238.192 17,858.070 0.977 240,391.000
wij 4,785 0.042 0.176 0.000 5.127
Share of trade credit received βi 4,785 0.150 0.279 0.000 17.043
Dependent variable:
Sales growth rate (g) 4,785 0.099 0.249 -2.832 3.765
Independent variables:
1) production relationship exposures (first term in equation (10)) computed relative to:
– economy benchmark 4,785 0.002 0.052 -0.781 1.142
– industry benchmark 4,785 0.001 0.067 -3.229 0.958
– state benchmark 4,785 0.002 0.054 -0.751 1.555
– county benchmark 4,785 0.002 0.051 -0.781 1.387
2) Trade credit exposures (second term in equation (10)) computed relative to:
– economy benchmark 4,785 0.000 0.012 -0.266 0.710
– industry benchmark 4,785 0.000 0.012 -0.315 0.616
– state benchmark 4,785 0.000 0.011 -0.281 0.580
– county benchmark 4,785 0.000 0.012 -0.266 0.695
Panel B: Customers descriptive statistics – Expansion
wij 3,782 0.041 0.182 0.000 5.127
Share of trade credit received βi 3,782 0.151 0.145 0.000 4.369
Dependent variable:
Sales growth rate (g) 3,782 0.106 0.251 -2.832 3.765
Independent variables:
1) production relationship exposures (first term in equation (10)) computed relative to:
– economy benchmark 3,782 0.002 0.054 -0.781 1.142
– industry benchmark 3,782 0.000 0.073 -3.229 0.958
– state benchmark 3,782 0.002 0.056 -0.751 1.555
– county benchmark 3,782 0.002 0.052 -0.781 1.387
2) Trade credit exposures (second term in equation (10)) computed relative to:
– economy benchmark 3,782 0.000 0.007 -0.266 0.148
– industry benchmark 3,782 0.000 0.009 -0.315 0.149
– state benchmark 3,782 0.000 0.007 -0.281 0.152
– county benchmark 3,782 0.000 0.007 -0.266 0.148
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Table I cont.
Panel C: Customers descriptive statistics – Recession
wij 1,003 0.043 0.154 0.000 2.612
Share of trade credit received βi 1,003 0.146 0.541 0.007 17.043
Dependent variable:
Sales growth rate (g) 1,003 0.074 0.242 -2.045 2.311
Independent variables:
1) production relationship exposures (first term in equation (10)) computed relative to:
– economy benchmark 1,003 0.001 0.045 -0.397 0.541
– industry benchmark 1,003 0.003 0.043 -0.277 0.578
– state benchmark 1,003 0.002 0.045 -0.404 0.535
– county benchmark 1,003 0.001 0.045 -0.398 0.538
2) Trade credit exposures (second term in equation (10)) computed relative to:
– economy benchmark 1,003 0.001 0.023 -0.021 0.710
– industry benchmark 1,003 0.001 0.020 -0.024 0.616
– state benchmark 1,003 0.001 0.019 -0.021 0.580
– county benchmark 1,003 0.001 0.022 -0.021 0.695
Panel D: Suppliers descriptive statistics – Years 1980–2004
Assets [$ billions] 9,383 946.294 4,417.068 0.251 188,874.000
EBIT [$ billions] 9,292 76.940 492.240 -5,281.200 12,863.000
Sales [$ billions] 9,383 830.639 3,496.323 0.016 80,514.600
Accounts payable 9,380 79.916 376.951 0.000 8,946.788
Cost of goods sold 9,383 570.839 2,629.067 0.000 76,956.000
Sales growth rate (g) 9,383 0.101 0.452 -2.994 6.367
Shock (e) computed relative to:
– economy benchmark 9,383 -0.002 0.448 -3.172 6.249
– industry benchmark 9,383 0.002 0.427 -3.038 6.136
– state benchmark 9,383 -0.001 0.444 -3.246 6.264
– county benchmark 9,383 -0.001 0.445 -3.172 6.250
Panel E: Suppliers descriptive statistics – Expansion
Sales growth rate (g) 7,422 0.116 0.460 -2.994 6.367
Shock (e) computed relative to:
– economy benchmark 7,422 0.003 0.457 -3.172 6.249
– industry benchmark 7,422 0.003 0.435 -3.038 6.136
– state benchmark 7,422 0.003 0.453 -3.246 6.264
– county benchmark 7,422 0.005 0.453 -3.172 6.250
Panel F: Suppliers descriptive statistics – Recession
Sales growth rate (g) 1,961 0.043 0.418 -2.552 3.875
Shock (e) computed relative to:
– economy benchmark 1,961 -0.021 0.415 -2.585 3.791
– industry benchmark 1,961 0.001 0.391 -2.414 3.715
– state benchmark 1,961 -0.017 0.410 -2.568 3.707
– county benchmark 1,961 -0.021 0.412 -2.585 3.787
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Table II
Correlation between customer sales growth and supplier sales growth
Pairwise correlation coefficients are calculated over all 12,985 observations which cover customer–supplier
pairs pooled over all years with non-missing values of assets, cost of goods sold and non-missing values of
sales in two consecutive years. The sales growth among customers is denoted by gCust and among supplier
by gSupp. The economy benchmark is denoted by g¯E , the industry benchmark by g¯I , the state benchmark by
g¯S , and the county benchmark by g¯C . The shock calculated relative to the economy benchmark is denoted
by eE , relative to the industry benchmark by eI , relative to the state benchmark by eS , and relative to the
county benchmark by eC
gCust gSupp g¯E g¯I g¯S g¯C eE eI eS eC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
gCust 1.000
gSupp 0.155 1.000
g¯E 0.223 0.131 1.000
g¯I 0.216 0.332 0.390 1.000
g¯S 0.207 0.179 0.714 0.363 1.000
g¯C 0.153 0.177 0.610 0.278 0.476 1.000
eE 0.128 0.992 0.005 0.286 0.090 0.102 1.000
eI 0.080 0.930 -0.013 -0.038 0.048 0.079 0.940 1.000
eS 0.118 0.982 -0.003 0.268 -0.009 0.090 0.991 0.936 1.000
eC 0.125 0.979 0.007 0.280 0.083 -0.028 0.987 0.928 0.979 1.000
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Table III
Trade credit relationship as insurance against supplier’s shocks
The table shows that in general trade credit works as insurance against suppliers’ shocks by reducing dis-
turbances to customer’s sales growth. The table shows coefficient estimates of equation (10), in which the
dependent variable is sales growth among customers and the supplier shock is computed relative to the
economy benchmark. Column (2) shows that the effect exists even if controlling for firm, year, industry
and state heterogeneity. Columns (3) and (4) show that the effect persist even if controlling for industry-
year common shocks or state-year common shocks. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The figures
in square brackets represent the economic effect of the production and trade credit relationships, which is
the response in a customer’s sales growth to a one standard deviation increase in the shock to all of its
suppliers. It is given as the average over all suppliers of:
(
φαnDijSD[ej ]
)
for the production relationship and
by
(
ηβi
α(1−α)
n [DW
′D]ij SD[ej ]
)
for the trade credit relationship. The sample runs from 1980 to 2004. All
regressions include a constant. Significance is denoted by * at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level and *** at
99% level.
Dependent variable: Customers sales growth (g)
Baseline F.E. Time varying F.E.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Production relationship (φ) 1.111*** 0.966*** 0.976*** 1.036***
(0.070) (0.075) (0.087) (0.071)
[0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Trade credit relationship (η) -1.210*** -1.406*** -0.676* -1.019***
(0.301) (0.337) (0.353) (0.303)
[-0.001] [-0.001] [-0.001] [-0.001]
Firm F.E. No Yes No No
Year F.E. No Yes No No
Industry F.E. No Yes No No
State F.E. No Yes No No
Year *Industry F.E. No No Yes No
Year*State F.E. No No No Yes
N 4,785 4,349 4,785 4,349
Adj.-R2 0.050 0.352 0.137 0.127
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Table IV
Trade credit and customer’s importance
The table shows coefficient estimates of equation (10), in which the dependent variable is sales growth among
customers and the supplier shock is computed relative to the economy benchmark. Column (1) shows that
the effect disappears if the trade credit relationship between firms is negligible (βi among bottom 10%).
Columns (2) shows results for the model with only a production relationship. Column (3) shows results
for the constrained regression in which φ is constrained to a value of one which is predicted by the theory.
And column (4) focuses on a sub-sample of customers with suppliers highly dependent on their demand.
We test here if the reverse causal relationship, in which the customer’s growth drives positive shocks to
suppliers, reveals itself by a significant coefficient on the ‘Top 10% reliant suppliers’ term. Standard errors
in parentheses. The figures in square brackets represent the economic effect of the production and trade
credit relationships, which is the response in a customer’s sales growth to a one standard deviation increase
in the shock to all of its suppliers. It is given as the average over all suppliers of:
(
φαnDijSD[ej ]
)
for the
production relationship and by
(
ηβi
α(1−α)
n [DW
′D]ij SD[ej ]
)
for the trade credit relationship. The sample
runs from 1980 to 2004. All regressions include a constant. Significance is denoted by * at the 90% level, **
at the 95% level and *** at 99% level.
Dependent variable: Customers sales growth (g)
Low βi among Production Constrained Strategic
bottom 10% network only regression customers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Production relationship (φ) 1.582*** 1.040*** 1.000 1.110***
(0.351) (0.068) constrained (0.070)
[0.007] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005]
Trade credit relationship (η) 19.501 - -1.090*** -1.212***
(28.354) (0.291) (0.301)
[0.018] [-0.001] [-0.001]
Top 10% reliant suppliers -0.011
(0.012)
F.E. No No No No
N 489 4,785 4,785 4,785
Adj.-R2 (MSE in column (3)) 0.043 0.047 0.243 0.051
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Table V
Trade credit and financial constraints
The table shows coefficient estimates of equation (10), in which the dependent variable is sales growth
among customers and the supplier shock is computed relative to the economy benchmark. Column (1)
shows that the trade credit relationship reduces disturbances to customer’s sales growth during good times
but not during recession. Recession years are taken from the NBER business cycle reference dates and
cover years: 1980, 1981, 1982, 1990, 1991 and 2001. The expansion years cover years: from 1983 to 1989,
from 1992 to 2000 and from 2002 to 2004. Column (2) shows that for cash poor customers, a trade credit
relationship amplifies disturbances to sales growth. This stems from the positive sign on the interaction
term between the trade credit relationship and a dummy for cash poor customers. The cash poor customers
are defined as 5% of the customers which in the previous year had the lowest liquid assets relative to their
sales. Column (3) illustrates that for financially constrained firms the existence of a trade credit relationship
translates into higher disturbances in sales growth from suppliers shocks. Financial constraint is computed
according to Rajan and Zingales (1998). Column (4) shows that trade credit relationship translates into
higher disturbances in sales growth either during recession or for financially constrained firms. The sample
runs from 1980 to 2004. Standard errors in parentheses. The figures in square brackets represent the
economic effect of the production and trade credit relationships, which is the response in a customer’s sales
growth to a one standard deviation increase in the shock to all of its suppliers. It is given as the average
over all suppliers of:
(
φαnDijSD[ej ]
)
for the production relationship and by
(
ηβi
α(1−α)
n [DW
′D]ij SD[ej ]
)
for the trade credit relationship. The sample runs from 1980 to 2004. All regressions include a constant.
Significance is denoted by * at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level and *** at 99% level.
Dependent variable: Customers sales growth (g)
Recession Cash reserves Fin. dependence Fin. dependence
in recession
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Production relationship (φ) 1.310*** 1.014*** 1.237*** 1.359***
(0.075) (0.093) (0.074) (0.077)
[0.006] [0.004] [0.005] [0.006]
Trade credit relationship (η) -5.233*** -4.761*** -10.017*** -11.616***
(0.629) (0.860) (1.287) (1.373)
[-0.005] [-0.004] [-0.009] [-0.011]
Trade credit relationship*Recession 5.186*** 7.418**
(0.709) (3.742)
[0.005] [0.007]
Recession -0.031*** -0.031***
(0.009) (0.009)
Trade credit relationship*Top 10% 9.203*** 7.710***
dependent on ext. fin. (1.303) (1.448)
[0.009] [0.007]
Top 10% dependent on ext. fin. -0.071*** -0.069***
(0.012) (0.012)
Trade credit relationship*Recession -3.528
∗Top 10% dependent on ext. fin. (3.798)
[-0.003]
Trade credit relationship*Bottom 5% 72.219***
cash poor firms (20.554)
[0.068]
Bottom 5% cash poor firms 0.035**
(0.016)
F.E. No No No No
N 4,785 3,245 4,728 4,728
Adj.-R2 0.063 0.039 0.065 0.073
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Table VI
Trade credit and financial constraints - robustness
The table shows coefficient estimates of equation (10), in which the dependent variable is sales growth
among customers and the supplier shock is computed relative to the economy benchmark. Column (1) and
(2) control for customer level common shocks and show that during recession firms which high use of trade
credit suffer higher disturbances to their sales growth than those with only small use of trade credit. Also,
financially constrained firms with high use of trade credit will suffer higher disturbances than financially
constrained firms with little trade credit. Recession years are taken from the NBER business cycle reference
dates and cover years: 1980, 1981, 1982, 1990, 1991 and 2001. The expansion years cover years: from 1983
to 1989, from 1992 to 2000 and from 2002 to 2004. Column (3) and (4) show no significant relationship
for customers with highly dependent supplier. The sample runs from 1980 to 2004. Standard errors in
parentheses. The figures in square brackets represent the economic effect of the production and trade credit
relationships, which is the response in a customer’s sales growth to a one standard deviation increase in the
shock to all of its suppliers. It is given as the average over all suppliers of:
(
φαnDijSD[ej ]
)
for the production
relationship and by
(
ηβi
α(1−α)
n [DW
′D]ij SD[ej ]
)
for the trade credit relationship. The sample runs from
1980 to 2004. All regressions include a constant. Significance is denoted by * at the 90% level, ** at the
95% level and *** at 99% level.
Dependent variable: Customers sales growth (g)
Time varying F.E. Strategic customers
Recession Fin. dependence Recession Fin. dependence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Production relationship (φ) 1.221*** 1.150*** 1.309*** 1.236***
(0.076) (0.075) (0.075) (0.074)
[0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005]
Trade credit relationship (η) -4.936*** -10.599*** -5.235*** -10.023***
(0.658) (1.431) (0.629) (1.287)
[-0.005] [-0.010] [-0.005] [-0.009]
Trade credit relationship*Recession 4.917*** 5.187***
(0.735) (0.709)
[0.005] [0.005]
Recession 0.176 -0.031***
(0.462) (0.009)
Trade credit relationship*Top 10% 9.937*** 9.208***
dependent on ext. fin. (1.445) (1.303)
[0.009] [0.009]
Top 10% dependent on ext. fin. -0.070 -0.071***
(0.013) (0.012)
Top 10% reliant suppliers -0.011 -0.012
(0.012) (0.012)
Year*State F.E. Yes Yes No No
N 4,349 4,308 4,785 4,728
Adj.-R2 0.138 0.148 0.063 0.065
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Table VII
Industry benchmark
Panel A shows that a trade credit relationship reduces disturbances to sales growth. It shows coefficient
estimates of equation (10), in which the dependent variable is sales growth among customers and the supplier
shock is computed relative to the industry benchmark. Panel B shows that the insurance effect is irrespective
of the customer’s importance, which suggests no reverse causality. Panel C shows that the trade credit
insurance effect is absent during recession or for cash poor firms or for financially constrained firms. Panel D
shows that the trade credit insurance effect is absent in those cases even if controlling for state-year common
shocks. Standard errors in parentheses. The figures in square brackets represent the economic effect of
the production and trade credit relationships, which is the response in a customer’s sales growth to a one
standard deviation increase in the shock to all of its suppliers. It is given as the average over all suppliers of:(
φαnDijSD[ej ]
)
for the production relationship and by
(
ηβi
α(1−α)
n [DW
′D]ij SD[ej ]
)
for the trade credit
relationship. The sample runs from 1980 to 2004. All regressions include a constant. Significance is denoted
by * at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level and *** at 99% level.
Dependent variable: Customers sales growth (g)
Panel A: Trade credit as insurance against supplier’s shocks
Baseline F.E. Time varying F.E.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Production relationship (φ) 0.626*** 0.539*** 0.631*** 0.573***
(0.058) (0.063) (0.069) (0.059)
[0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002]
Trade credit relationship (η) -1.531*** -1.552*** -1.283*** -1.420***
(0.332) (0.374) (0.397) (0.336)
[-0.001] [-0.001] [-0.001] [-0.001]
Firm F.E. No Yes No No
Year F.E. No Yes No No
Industry F.E. No Yes No No
State F.E. No Yes No No
Year *Industry F.E. No No Yes No
Year*State F.E. No No No Yes
N 4,785 4,349 4,785 4,349
Adj.-R2 0.024 0.335 0.123 0.099
Panel B: Customer’s importance
Low βi among Production Constrained Strategic
bottom 10% network only regression customers
Production relationship (φ) 1.354*** 0.518*** 1.000 0.625***
(0.365) (0.053) constrained (0.058)
[0.006] [0.002] [0.004] [0.003]
Trade credit relationship (η) -30.921 -2.400*** -1.531***
(23.411) (0.305) (0.332)
[-0.028] [-0.002] [-0.001]
Top 10% reliant suppliers -0.013
(0.012)
F.E. No No No No
N 489 4,785 4,785 4,785
Adj.-R2 (MSE in column (3)) 0.024 0.019 0.248 0.024
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Table VII cont.
Dependent variable: Customers sales growth (g)
Panel C: Financial constraints
Recession Cash reserves Fin. dependence Fin. dependence
in recession
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Production relationship (φ) 0.861*** 0.616*** 0.636*** 0.840***
(0.066) (0.082) (0.059) (0.067)
[0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Trade credit relationship (η) -4.990*** -4.820*** -7.031*** -9.133***
(0.584) (0.856) (1.520) (1.562)
[-0.004] [-0.004] [-0.006] [-0.008]
Trade credit relationship*Recession 4.367*** 7.404**
(0.603) (3.040)
[0.004] [0.007]
Recession -0.034*** -0.034***
(0.009) (0.009)
Trade credit relationship*Top 10% 5.724*** 4.724***
dependent on ext. fin. (1.524) (1.575)
[0.005] [0.004]
Top 10% dependent on ext. fin. -0.076*** -0.074***
(0.012) (0.012)
Trade credit relationship*Recession -4.106
∗Top 10% dependent on ext. fin. (3.566)
[-0.004]
Trade credit relationship*Bottom 5% 14.932
cash poor firms (26.059)
[0.013]
Bottom 5% cash poor firms 0.028*
(0.016)
F.E. No No No No
N 4,785 3,245 4,728 4,728
Adj.-R2 0.037 0.017 0.033 0.044
Panel D: Financial constraints - robustness
Time varying F.E. Strategic customers
Recession Fin. dependence Recession Fin. dependence
Production relationship (φ) 0.810*** 0.584*** 0.860*** 0.635***
(0.067) (0.060) (0.066) (0.059)
[0.003] [0.002] [0.004] [0.003]
Trade credit relationship (η) -5.015*** -8.422*** -4.989*** -7.037***
(0.607) (1.709) (0.584) (1.520)
[-0.004] [-0.007] [-0.004] [-0.006]
Trade credit relationship*Recession 4.397*** 4.365***
(0.621) (0.603)
[0.004] [0.004]
Recession -0.167 -0.034***
(0.741) (0.009)
Trade credit relationship*Top 10% 7.228*** 5.729***
dependent on ext. fin. (1.712) (1.524)
[0.006] [0.005]
Top 10% dependent on ext. fin. -0.075 -0.076***
(0.013) (0.012)
Top 10% reliant suppliers -0.012 -0.014
(0.012) (0.012)
Year*State F.E. Yes Yes No No
N 4,349 4,308 4,785 4,728
Adj.-R2 0.112 0.115 0.037 0.033
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Table VIII
State benchmark
Panel A shows that a trade credit relationship reduces disturbances to sales growth. It shows coefficient
estimates of equation (10), in which the dependent variable is sales growth among customers and the supplier
shock is computed relative to the state benchmark. Panel B shows that the insurance effect is irrespective
of the customer’s importance, which suggests no reverse causality. Panel C shows that the trade credit
insurance effect is absent during recession or for cash poor firms or for financially constrained firms. Panel D
shows that the trade credit insurance effect is absent in those cases even if controlling for state-year common
shocks. Standard errors in parentheses. The figures in square brackets represent the economic effect of
the production and trade credit relationships, which is the response in a customer’s sales growth to a one
standard deviation increase in the shock to all of its suppliers. It is given as the average over all suppliers of:(
φαnDijSD[ej ]
)
for the production relationship and by
(
ηβi
α(1−α)
n [DW
′D]ij SD[ej ]
)
for the trade credit
relationship. The sample runs from 1980 to 2004. All regressions include a constant. Significance is denoted
by * at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level and *** at 99% level.
Dependent variable: Customers sales growth (g)
Panel A: Trade credit as insurance against supplier’s shocks
Baseline F.E. Time varying F.E.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Production relationship (φ) 1.049*** 0.929*** 0.943*** 1.019***
(0.069) (0.074) (0.085) (0.071)
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Trade credit relationship (η) -1.623*** -1.729*** -0.969** -1.460***
(0.345) (0.383) (0.419) (0.348)
[-0.002] [-0.002] [-0.001] [-0.001]
Firm F.E. No Yes No No
Year F.E. No Yes No No
Industry F.E. No Yes No No
State F.E. No Yes No No
Year *Industry F.E. No No Yes No
Year*State F.E. No No No Yes
N 4,785 4,349 4,785 4,349
Adj.-R2 0.046 0.351 0.135 0.126
Panel B: Customer’s importance
Low βi among Production Constrained Strategic
bottom 10% networks only regression customers
Production relationship (φ) 1.538*** 0.951*** 1.000 1.048***
(0.335) (0.066) constrained (0.069)
[0.007] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Trade credit relationship (η) 44.904 -1.549*** -1.625***
(29.239) (0.329) (0.345)
[0.042] [-0.001] [-0.002]
Top 10% reliant suppliers -0.012
(0.012)
F.E. No No No No
N 489 4,785 4,785 4,785
Adj.-R2 (MSE in column (3)) 0.050 0.042 0.244 0.046
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Table VIII cont.
Dependent variable: Customers sales growth (g)
Panel C: Financial constraints
Recession Cash reserves Fin. dependence Fin. dependence
in recession
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Production relationship (φ) 1.240*** 0.947*** 1.134*** 1.270***
(0.074) (0.093) (0.072) (0.076)
[0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005]
Trade credit relationship (η) -5.129*** -4.976*** -9.063*** -10.753***
(0.606) (0.865) (1.276) (1.371)
[-0.005] [-0.005] [-0.008] [-0.010]
Trade credit relationship*Recession 4.221*** 7.447**
(0.597) (3.721)
[0.004] [0.007]
Recession -0.032*** -0.031***
(0.009) (0.009)
Trade credit relationship*Top 10% 7.903*** 6.710***
dependent on ext. fin. (1.296) (1.429)
[0.007] [0.006]
Top 10% dependent on ext. fin. -0.072*** -0.070***
(0.012) (0.012)
Trade credit relationship*Recession -5.007
∗Top 10% dependent on ext. fin. (4.592)
[-0.005]
Trade credit relationship*Bottom 5% 68.379***
cash poor firms (19.663)
[0.063]
Bottom 5% cash poor firms 0.033**
(0.016)
F.E. No No No No
N 4,785 3,245 4,728 4,728
Adj.-R2 0.058 0.034 0.059 0.067
Panel D: Financial constraints - robustness
Time varying F.E. Strategic customers
Recession Fin. dependence Recession Fin. dependence
Production relationship (φ) 1.208*** 1.102*** 1.239*** 1.133***
(0.076) (0.073) (0.074) (0.072)
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Trade credit relationship (η) -5.055*** -9.962*** -5.132*** -9.073***
(0.633) (1.415) (0.606) (1.276)
[-0.005] [-0.009] [-0.005] [-0.008]
Trade credit relationship*Recession 4.168*** 4.222***
(0.615) (0.597)
[0.004] [0.004]
Recession 0.176 -0.032***
(0.462) (0.009)
Trade credit relationship*Top 10% 8.939*** 7.911***
dependent on ext. fin. (1.433) (1.296)
[0.008] [0.007]
Top 10% dependent on ext. fin. -0.070 -0.072***
(0.013) (0.012)
Top 10% reliant suppliers -0.012 -0.013
(0.012) (0.012)
Year*State F.E. Yes Yes No No
N 4,349 4,308 4,785 4,728
Adj.-R2 0.138 0.146 0.058 0.059
41
Table IX
County benchmark
Panel A shows that a trade credit relationship reduces disturbances to sales growth. It shows coefficient
estimates of equation (10), in which the dependent variable is sales growth among customers and the supplier
shock is computed relative to the county benchmark. Panel B shows that the insurance effect is irrespective
of the customer’s importance, which suggests no reverse causality. Panel C shows that the trade credit
insurance effect is absent during recession or for cash poor firms or for financially constrained firms. Panel D
shows that the trade credit insurance effect is absent in those cases even if controlling for state-year common
shocks. Standard errors in parentheses. The figures in square brackets represent the economic effect of
the production and trade credit relationships, which is the response in a customer’s sales growth to a one
standard deviation increase in the shock to all of its suppliers. It is given as the average over all suppliers of:(
φαnDijSD[ej ]
)
for the production relationship and by
(
ηβi
α(1−α)
n [DW
′D]ij SD[ej ]
)
for the trade credit
relationship. The sample runs from 1980 to 2004. All regressions include a constant. Significance is denoted
by * at the 90% level, ** at the 95% level and *** at 99% level.
Dependent variable: Customers sales growth (g)
Panel A: Trade credit as insurance against supplier’s shocks
Baseline F.E. Time varying F.E.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Production relationship (φ) 1.181*** 1.071*** 1.051*** 1.116***
(0.071) (0.078) (0.088) (0.073)
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005]
Trade credit relationship (η) -1.231*** -1.405*** -0.665* -1.035***
(0.305) (0.341) (0.359) (0.307)
[-0.001] [-0.001] [-0.001] [-0.001]
Firm F.E. No Yes No No
Year F.E. No Yes No No
Industry F.E. No Yes No No
State F.E. No Yes No No
Year *Industry F.E. No No Yes No
Year*State F.E. No No No Yes
N 4,785 4,349 4,785 4,349
Adj.-R2 0.054 0.357 0.142 0.133
Panel B: Customer’s importance
Low βi among Production Constrained Strategic
bottom 10% network only regression customers
Production relationship (φ) 1.586*** 1.109*** 1.000 1.179***
(0.350) (0.069) constrained (0.071)
[0.007] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005]
Trade credit relationship (η) 21.561 -1.038*** -1.232***
(27.964) (0.296) (0.305)
[0.020] [-0.001] [-0.001]
Top 10% reliant suppliers -0.011
(0.012)
F.E. No No No No
N 489 4,785 4,785 4,785
Adj.-R2 (MSE in column (3)) 0.044 0.051 0.243 0.054
42
Table IX cont.
Dependent variable: Customers sales growth (g)
Panel C: Financial constraints
Recession Cash reserves Fin. dependence Fin. dependence
in recession
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Production relationship (φ) 1.371*** 1.118*** 1.260*** 1.388***
(0.076) (0.095) (0.074) (0.077)
[0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006]
Trade credit relationship (η) -5.144*** -4.575*** -8.665*** -9.989***
(0.630) (0.862) (1.321) (1.413)
[-0.005] [-0.004] [-0.008] [-0.009]
Trade credit relationship*Recession 4.983*** 5.042
(0.697) (3.731)
[0.005] [0.005]
Recession -0.031*** -0.031***
(0.009) (0.009)
Trade credit relationship*Top 10% 7.779*** 5.841***
dependent on ext. fin. (1.339) (1.493)
[0.007] [0.005]
Top 10% fin. constrained firms -0.071*** -0.069***
(0.012) (0.012)
Trade credit relationship*Recession -1.015
∗Top 10% dependent on ext. fin. (3.870)
[-0.001]
Trade credit relationship*Bottom 5% 71.442***
cash poor firms (20.701)
[0.066]
Bottom 5% cash poor firms 0.035**
(0.016)
F.E. No No No No
N 4,785 3,245 4,728 4,728
Adj.-R2 0.066 0.044 0.066 0.074
Panel D: Financial constraints - robustness
Time varying F.E. Strategic customers
Recession Fin. dependence Recession Fin. dependence
Production relationship (φ) 1.293*** 1.176*** 1.370*** 1.259***
(0.077) (0.075) (0.076) (0.074)
[0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005]
Trade credit relationship (η) -4.840*** -8.937*** -5.147*** -8.674***
(0.659) (1.485) (0.630) (1.321)
[-0.004] [-0.008] [-0.005] [-0.008]
Trade credit relationship*Recession 4.712*** 4.984***
(0.723) (0.697)
[0.004] [0.005]
Recession 0.176 -0.031***
(0.460) (0.009)
Trade credit relationship*Top 10% 8.205*** 7.786***
dependent on ext. fin. (1.501) (1.339)
[0.008] [0.007]
Top 10% dependent on ext. fin. -0.0693 -0.071***
(0.013) (0.012)
Top 10% reliant suppliers -0.011 -0.012
(0.012) (0.012)
Year*State F.E. Yes Yes No No
N 4,349 4,308 4,785 4,728
Adj.-R2 0.143 0.150 0.066 0.066
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